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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

'FUTURE INTERESTS-POWER OF TERMINATION-RESTRAINT ON ALIENATION-MERGER OF THE PowER OF TERMINATION WITH THE FEE SIMPLE
SUBJECT TO A CONDITION SUBSEQUENT-A. conveyed two tracts of land to B,
her daughter, by two deeds, reserving a life estate in each tract and restraining,
by condition subsequent, alienation of them in any manner, for five years in
one deed, and for twelve years in the second. In less than five years and before
the restrictions were violated, A died and B was adjudged her sole and only heir
at law. Thereafter B conveyed the land by quit claim deed to the defendant,
her husband. B died a month later, leaving a will, by which she devised and bequeathed all her property to the defendant. The heirs of B were adjudged to
be eight aunts and uncles, who are the plaintiffs here, and the defendant.
Plaintiffs bring this ·action against the defendant to quiet title and obtain an
accounting for rents and partition of the realty; they ask that each of the
plaintiffs be decreed owner of an undivid(!d one-sixteenth of the land and the
defendant of an undivided one-half. Held, the restraint on alienation imposed
by A was valid as being reasonably necessary to protect A's life estate; it was
a condition subsequent to the grant to B, leaving a power of termination in A,
which on A's death passed to B as A's sole heir, and ceased to exist because of
the union in B of the power to enforce the restraint and the interest so restrained; title ·was, therefore, quieted in the defendant. Watson v. Dalton,
(Neb. 1945) 18 N.W. (2d) 658.
.
It seems clear that the forfeiture restraint on alienation, call~d, valid in the
principal case under the Nebraska doctrine upholding such restraints when
reasonably necessary to protect the interest of the grantor,1 would not be allowed
in most states since, even though limited in duration, the restraint was complete,2 and was imposed on a fee simple subject to a life estate which, but for the
1 Majerus v. Santo, 143 Neb. 774, IO N.W. (2d) 608 (1943); Peters v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., II9 Neb. 161, 227 N.W. 917 (1929); 2 SIMES, FuTIJRE
INTERESTS, § 458 (1936). FQr the majority view as to the validity of such restraints,
see: 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 406 (1944); 2 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 447
et. seq. (1936); Schnebly, "Restraints upon the Alienation of Legal Interests," 44
YALE L.J. 961, II86, 1380 (1935).
2 The provisions were as follows: "The grantor •..• restricts the grantee for a
period of 5 years from this date, from selling or mortgaging said premises or in any
manner during said period from placing or causing to place a lien of any kind against
said premises." Quoted by the court, principal case at 661_.
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restraint, would have been indefeasible.8 However, once it is conceded that the
grantor did reserve a valid power of termination, the conclusion of the court
that the power of termination was extinguished because of the union in one
person of the power to enforce the restraint and the interest so restrained seems
to be a desirable one. It should be noticed that both the Nebraska court and the
American Law Institute in their Property Restatement, on which the decision
in the principal case was largely based, in this regard, use the term "ceased to
exist" to describe the extinguishment instead of the word "merged." 4 And yet
where the particular forfeiture restraint involved is in the form of a condition
subsequent, leaving in the grantor a power of termination, it is hard to understand what the theory for such an extinguishment is, unless it is that of merger.
Opposing such an application of the doctrine of merger, however, is the familiar
holding, which has been recognized in a variety of cases, that a power of termination is really not an interest in land at all, but merely a right in the grantor. 5
Applying this idea, it has been held that where a grantor creates a power of
termination, in conveying an estate less than a fee, and retains a reversionary
interest, they do not merge,° even where it is a reversion in fee.7 Nevertheless,
the result in the principal case would seem to be all supported by analogy to
cases where courts have allowed a power of termination to be extinguished by
3 The generally accepted view in this country is that restraints on vested future
interests are governed by the same rules that govern possessory interests. 4 PROPERTY
RESTATEMENT, § 41 l (1944); 2 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 467 (1936); Schnebly,
"Restraints upon the Alienation of Legal Interests: II," 44 YALE L. J. u86 at 1212
(1935); Gray v. Shinn, 293 Ill. 573, 127 N.E. 755 (1920); Lathrop v. Merrill,
207 Mass. 6, 92 N.E. 1019 (1910); Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78 (1874).
4 "It is affrmatively stated in Restatement, Property, sec. 423, p. 4265: 'An otherwise valid restraint on alienation ceases to exist * * * in the case of a promissory restraint
in the form of a condition subsequent, upon a union of the power to enforce the
restraint and the interest so restrained in the same person; * * *' This statement is
on all fours with the case at bar, and governs its decision ....". Principal case at 663.
5 Courts have frequently regarded powers of termination as something less than
an interest in land. See: Upington v. Corrigan, 151 N.Y. 143, 45 N.E. 359 (1896);
People v. Wainwright, 237 N.Y. 407, 143 N.E. 236 (1924); Parry v. Berkeley
Hall School Foundation, IO Cal. (2d) 422, 74 P. (2d) 738 (1937); Copenhaver v.
Pendleton, 155 Va. 463, 155 S.E. 802 (1930); 77 A.L.R. 344 (1932). In South
Carolina the statutes of descent are held not to apply to possibilities of reverter because
they are not "estates." It has also been held there that a possibility of reverter is not a
substantial enough interest to merge. Adams v. Chaplin, 1 Hill (S.C. Eq.) 265 (1833).
See also: 4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY, § 2129 (1939); 1 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS,§ 159 (1936); I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY,§ 209 (1939).
6 Parry v. Berkeley Hall School Foundation, 10 Cal. (2d) 422, 7,4 P. (2d) 738
(1937); ll4 A.L.R. 566 (1938); 2 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 1,55, comment c
(1936); 1 S1MES, FuTURE INTERESTS, § 165 (1936); 33 AM. JuR., § 208.
1 Parry v. Berkeley Hall School Foundation, IO Cal. .(2d) 422 at 426, 74 P.
(2d) 738 (1937), stated the rule as follows: " ••• The grantor may transfer land to
the grantee for life, subject to a condition subsequent restricting its use. In such case
the grantor has the reversion in fee and also has a right of reentry (power of termination), and they do not merge."
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a release to the person holding the other interests. 8 Surely on the basis of
results, at least, it is no more illogical to hold that a power of termination ceases
to exist when it passes by descent, than when it passes by release. Moreover,
considering the fact that courts have generally held the power of termination
to be enough of an interest to descend, 9 it appears that they have accorded to this
power many of the characteristics of a property interest. With this in mind,
and remembering the well known and long standing prejudice of the courts
against forfeitures for breach of conditions subsequent,1° perhaps most forcefully
demonstrated in the cases where it has been held that an attempt to alienate a
power of termination is not only ineffective to. transfer the power, but destroys
it as well; 11 objections to the result reached by the Nebraska court in the principal case would seem more technical than substantial.
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8 Trustees of Calvary Presbyterian Church v. Putnam, 249 N.Y. I II, 162 N.E.
601 (1928); Huntley v. McBrayer, 1.72 N.C. 642, 90 S.E. 754 (1916); Arnold v.
Scharff, (Tex. Civ. App.) 210 S.W. 326 (1918); Schulman v. Ellenville Elec. Co.,
152 Misc. 843, 273 N.Y.S. 530 (1934); Jones v. Williams, 132 Ga. 782, 64 S.E.
I 081 ( 1909). And this same result has been allowed in cases involving possibilities of
reverter: Pearse v. Killian, S.C. Eq. (McMullan) 234 ( I 841); 3 8 A.L.R. I II I
(1925); Brill v. Lynn, 207 Ky. 757, 270 S.W. 20 (1925); McArdle v. Hurley, 103
Misc. 540, 172 N.Y.S. 57 (1918); Adams v. Chaplin, 1 Hill (S.C. Eq.) 265 (1833);
33 AM. JuR., § 209.
The American Law Institute in their PROPERTY RESTATEMENT state that a power
of termination may be transferred by one of the joint holders of the power to another,
and may be transferred where the conveyor also has a reversionary interest which is
being transferred with the power of termination. 2 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 161
(1936).
9 North v. Graham, 235 Ill. 178, 85 N.E. 267 (1908); Copenhaver v. Pendleton, 155 Va. 463, 155 S.E. 802 (1930); 77 A.L.R. 344 (1932); 2 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §§ 164, 165 (1936); 3 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 724 (1936). It
has been held in New York that a power of termination passes by representation, rather
than by descent; but even there the power can be extinguished by release. Upington v.
Corrigan, 151 N.Y. 143, 45 N.E. 359 (1896); Trustees of Calvary Presbyterian
Church v. Putnam, 249 N.Y. III, 162 N.E. 601 (1928).
10 Allen v. Trustees of Great Neck Free Church, 240 N.Y. App. Div. 206, 269
N.Y.S. 341 (1934); Post v. Weil, II5 N.Y. 3'61, 22 N.E. 145 (1889); Hooper v.
Haas, 332 Ill. 561, 164 N.E. 23 (1928); Mead v. Ballard, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 290
(1868); Emerson v. Simpson, 43 N.H. 475 (1862); Carter v. Branson, 79 Ind. 14
(1881); IO R.C.L., § 86 (1915); l TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, § 193 (1939);
l SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, §§ 168 et seq. (1936).
11 Rice v. Boston & Worcester Railroad Corp., 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 141 (1866);
County of Oakland v. Mack, 243 Mich. 279, 220 N.W. 801 (1928); L.R.A. 1916F
3n; 109 A.L.R. II48 at u6o (1937); 2 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,§ 160, comment c (1936); 3 Si~Es, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 717 (1936).

